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I. Introduction
Dr. Norman Earl McElheney was born in Atlanta, Georgia, on September
29, 1956.1 The older of two children, Dr. McElheney was born into the
seemingly quintessential All-American family-his father was an engineer, and
his mother was an elementary school teacher.2 Active in both his church and
community, he became an Eagle Scout before graduating from high school.3
Also while a high school student, McElheneyjoined "Amigos de las Americas"
and traveled to Guatemala to help distribute medical vaccines to the country's
poor.4
After high school, Dr. McElheney attended college at Emory University,
majoring in chemistry.5 He then enrolled at Georgia State University to pursue
a Master's Degree in immunology, though he ultimately never completed the
program, withdrawing from the school upon his acceptance to the Medical
College of Georgia.6 After finishing in the top ten percent of his graduating
class and receiving his degree as a Doctor of Medicine, McElheney completed
his residency at the University of California at San Francisco. During this
time, he also worked at two children's hospitals.
1. See United States v. McElheney, 524 F. Supp. 2d 983, 992 (E.D. Tenn. 2007)
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In his free time, Dr. McElheney enjoyed going to the lake with his
children and relaxing on his farm with his three dogs, as well as exercising at
his local health club. 9 He was also a member of numerous professional
organizations and provided medical services for many local sports teams.' 0
Never losing his charitable spirit, McElheney volunteered his services to a
program that provided free health care to the poor and uninsured.'1
The above description paints a portrait of the ideal role model: an
educated and successful professional, an active and caring father, and a
compassionate and generous member of society. However, this portrait is
incomplete without one final brushstroke-on February 22, 2007, Dr.
McElheney pleaded guilty to knowingly receiving child pornography on his
computer'12 in violation of federal law.'13 As a first time offender, McElheney
was subject to a minimum sentence of five years, with a maximum sentence of
up to twenty years.'14 However, for the ease of computation, and for the sake of
clarity in examples, the remainder of this Note will proceed as if Dr.
McElheney had been charged with merely "possessing" child pornography, an
offense that carries a maximum sentence of ten years in prison.'" Possessing
child pornography is considered to be a lesser included offense of knowingly
receiving child pornography, and is also considered to be a more "passive"
offense.'16
Under either of these offenses, McElheney is subject to a period of
supervised release following his incarceration.'17 In the federal system, the
length of the supervised release term is dependent upon the seriousness of the




13. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) (2006) (making it a crime to "knowingly receive"
child pornography via interstate communication, including through the use of a computer).
14. Id. § 2252A(b)(1).
15. See id § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (making it a crime to possess or access child pornography
that has been transported or transferred via interstate communication, including through use of a
computer); id. § 2252A(b)(2) (providing the statutory maximum sentence of ten years for a
violation of subsection (a)(5)).
16. See United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
Double Jeopardy Clause bars the prosecution of a defendant for both receiving child
pornography and the lesser included offense of possessing child pornography); United States v.
McElheney, 524 F. Supp. 2d 983, 1000 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) ("Possession is passive and receiving
is more active.").
17. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (authorizing a five-year minimum term of supervised
release for those defendants convicted of any crime uider § 2252A).
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offense.' 8 Defendants convicted of Class A felonies (those offenses carrying a
maximum penalty of life imprisonment or death) are subject to a maximum of
five years of supervised release.19 However, the PROTECT Act of 2003 20
altered the supervised release statute as it pertains to sexual offenses against
minors .2' Those defendants convicted of crimes included under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(k) face a supervised release period of a minimum of five years, with a
maximum of lifetime supervision.2 Unfortunately for Dr. McElheney, both
receiving and possessing child pornography are included under this statute, and
as a result, McElheney was sentenced to a period of lifetime supervised release
following his incarceration.2
Congress justified this substantial increase from the general supervised
release policy with specific deterrence and rehabilitation arguments:
[18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)] responds to the long-standing concerns of Federal
judges and prosecutors regarding the inadequacy of the existing supervision
periods for sex offenders, particularly for the perpetrators of child sexual
abuse crimes, whose criminal conduct may reflect deep-seated aberrant
sexual disorders that are not likely to disappear within a few years of
release from prison. The current length of the authorized supervision
periods is not consistent with the need presented by many of these
offenders for long-term-and in some cases, life-long-monitoring and
oversight.24
Congress has also expressed its desire to impose harsher penalties on child
sex offenders in the Sentencing Guidelines, by stating that "if the instant
offense of conviction is a sex offense .. , the statutory maximum term of
supervised release is recommended., 2 5  Under the Sentencing Guidelines,
policy statements are to be taken into account by the sentencing judge.2 While
18. Id § 3583(b).
19. Id. § 3583(b)(1); see also id. § 3559(a) (classify'ing each offense according to the
letter grade system).
20. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-2 1, 117 Stat. 650, 650-95 (2003) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
21. Seel 18 U. S.C. § 3 583(k) (providing for increased supervised release terms for those
defendants convicted of specified sexual offenses against minors).
22. See id. ("[Tihe authorized term of supervised release for any offense [under this
section] ... is any term of years not less than 5, or life.").
23. See United States v. McElheney, 524 F. Supp. 2d 983, 1007 (E.D. Tenn. 2007)
(imposing a 135-month sentence of imprisonment and lifetime supervised release).
24. H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 49-50 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 684.
25. U.S. SENTENCING GuIDELINES MANUAL § 5131.2(b)(2) (2008).
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) (2006) (listing "any pertinent policy statement" as a factor
to be considered in sentencing).
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the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, judges still must consider them before
imposing a criminal sentence.2 Indeed, the previously mentioned policy
statement has been used as justification by the courts for imposing periods of
lifetime supervised release on defendants convicted of any crime covered by
§ 3583(k). 28
It seems that § 3583(k) includes an array of crimes varying substantially
with regards to reprehensibility-an argument supported by the wide range of
maximum sentences available for the listed offenses .2 Logically, one would
think that the lengthier supervised release periods would be reserved for the
more reprehensible crimes and criminals. However, if the policy statement of
Congress recommending maximum sentences for all sex offenses is followed
literally, each one of these offenses would result in the imposition of the exact
27. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,264 (2005) ("The district courts, while not
bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing.").
28. See, e.g., United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1199 (1lth Cir. 2008) (holding that
the policy statement urging the imposition of the maximum sentence for sex offenders is
consistent with § 3583(k) and is proper justification for imposing a lifetime term of supervised
release); United States v. Allison, 447 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 2006) (same).
29. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5) (2006) (providing a maximum sentence of ten
years for the possession of child pornography, suggesting a lesser degree of culpability), with id.
§ 2245 (providing a maximum sentence of death or life imprisonment for the commission of
murder during the course of a sexual offense, suggesting a maximum degree of culpability). But
ef Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1198 (finding that Congress "has expanded repeatedly criminal exposure
for the possession of child pornography" and "[fln light of these detailed legislative findings and
numerous legislative enactments, we cannot help but underscore the seriousness of this crime").
Many courts have argued that it is necessary to harshly punish passive recipients of child
pornography. See, e.g., id. ("Although the district court recognized that child pomnography is 'a
serious crime,' the sentence it imposed did not reflect the seriousness of the crime."). The
Seventh Circuit has succinctly explained a common justification for such harsh punishment:
Young children were raped in order to enable the production of the
pornography .... The greater the customer demand for child pornography, the
more that will be produced.... Sentences influence behavior, or so at least
Congress thought when in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) it made deterrence a statutory
sentencing factor. The logic of deterrence suggests that the lighter the punishment
for downloading and uploading child pornography, the greater the customer
demand for it and so the more will be produced.
United States v. Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2007).
While the logic seems sound, it is interesting that the opposite rationale has seemed to
prevail in regards to the illicit drug trade. See e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty By
Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REv. 102 1,
1066 (1999) (asserting that a prosecutor that makes a habit of "fixating on [small] fry" as
opposed to "big fish" has misguided priorities); Juan Torruella, The "War on Drugs ": One
Judge 's Attempt at aRational Discussion, 14 YALEJ. oN REG. 235,256 (1997) (lamenting "how
often the penalties for drug trafficking are imposed on individuals other than those most
culpable").
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same term of supervised release-life .3 0 This would appear to be at odds with
Congress's implicit recognition, demonstrated through the enactment of varying
statutory maximum sentences for these offenses, that these crimes do not all
deserve the same level of punishment .3'1 The Sentencing Guidelines explicitly
make mention of the need for proportionality in the supervised release
sentencing process, suggesting that the implementation of "three broad grades
of violations would permit proportionally longer terms for more serious
violations and thereby would address adequately concerns about
proportionality. 3 2 Unfortunately for those defendants subject to a term of
supervised release under § 3583(k), these "broad grades" do not apply to them.
Instead, a "one-size-fits-all" approach-where defendants of all types receive
lifetime terms-is employed.3
This judicial equalization of all offenses listed under § 3 583(k) would not
be as troubling if supervised release were more bark than bite. However, the
statute provides for not only the imposition of extended periods of supervised
release, but also for the revocation of supervised release-resulting in the
incarceration of the defendant for the remainder of the period.3 At a
supervised release revocation hearing, a prosecutor must only prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conditions of supervised release were
violated.3 Under the PROTECT Act, if a defendant who is required to register
under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)3 Commits
one of the listed sexual offenses while on supervised release, "the court shall
revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant to serve a term
30. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (authorizing a maximum term of lifetime supervised
release).
3 1. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (contrasting the statutory maximums for
two different offenses covered by § 3583(k), and suggesting that the disparity reveals
Congress's implicit recognition that the offenses have differing degrees of seriousness).
32. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL, ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2008).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Kenrick, 306 F. App'x 794, 795-96 (3d Cir. 2009)
(construing the policy statement advising that sex offenders receive the maximum penalty as
recommending lifetime periods of supervised release for those defendants subject to § 3 583(k));
United States v. Daniels, 541 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Carpenter,
280 F. App'x 866, 868 (11 th Cir. 2008) (same); United States v. Washington, 257 F. App'x
605, 606 (4th Cir. 2007) (same); United States v. Raflopoulos, 254 F. App'x 829, 831 (2d Cir.
2007) (same); United States v. Kennedy, 499 F.3d 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2007) (same); United
States v. Allison, 447 F.3d 402, 405 (5th Cir. 2006) (same).
34. See] 18 U.S. C. § 3 583(e)(3) (authorizing the incarceration of a defendant that violates
the terms of supervised release).
3 5. Id.
36. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 109-248, Title 1, 120 Stat.
587, 587-611 (2006) (creating a sex offender registry).
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of imprisonment. "37 Of course, in the case of a defendant like Dr. McElheney,
who received a lifetime tern, the revocation of supervised release would result
in life imprisonment. This Note will address the constitutional concerns
presented by such a scenario.
This Note will leave the policy positions of Congress that have resulted in
the increased punishment for sex offenders largely undisputed. However, it
would be remiss not to reference briefly a recent study that may, at least,
weaken the popular belief that all sex offenders have higher recidivism rates
than those criminals convicted of other crimes.3 The study found that only
nine percent of child pornography offenders with no prior criminal history
committed a similar crime in the future."9 This should be compared to the
overall recidivism rate of almost fourteen percent for federal offenders with
little to no prior criminal history.40 Based on this study, it would appear that
defendants like Dr. McElheney are less likely to re-offend than the average
defendant, and thus are arguably less deserving of increased periods of
supervised release. This having been said, the remainder of this Note will not
contest the arguments and reasoning behind § 3583(k), but will only draw
attention to potential constitutional and policy concerns presented by the
supervised release scheme. There is no doubt that sexual offenders, especially
those who commit a second sex offense while on supervised release, should be
punished harshly. However, this punishment should be doled out through the
adversarial trial process, and not through the streamlined revocation system.
Part 11 of this Note will provide a general overview of the supervised
release system and the revocation process. These procedures will then be
compared to those utilized during a full trial. This Section will establish the
relative lack of protection afforded defendants seeking to avoid supervised
release revocation and will emphasize the dangers presented by such a drastic
increase in the length of supervised release periods.
37. 18 U. S.C. § 35 83(k) (2006) (emphasis added).
38. See Michael C. Seto & Angela W. Eke, The Criminal Histories and Later Offending
of Child Pornography Offenders, 17 SExUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 201, 208 (2005)
("[Olur finding does contradict the assumption that all child pornography offenders are at very
high risk to commit contact sexual offenses involving children.").
39. Id.at 207.
40. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL
HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 7-8 (2004), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/RecidivismGeneral.pdf; UNITED STATES SENTENCING
COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES 2 (2004) (defining
Criminal History Category I), available at http.www.ussc.goviTRAINING/GLOverviewO4.pdfI
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Part Im will focus on the Supreme Court's findings in Johnson v. United
States.4 In examining a separate issue, the Court found that the revocation of
supervised release is not to be considered punishment for the act that was in
violation of the terms of release.4 Instead, the Court determined that any
period of incarceration stemming from revocation should be viewed as part of
the punishment for the initial offense.4
Part TV will examine a line of cases evolving from Apprendi v. New
Jersey,"4 which held that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.",4 5 Under Johnson, the "penalty for the crime"
includes any imprisonment stemming from the revocation of supervised
release.4 If, upon his release, Dr. McElheney's supervised release were to be
revoked, resulting in lifetime imprisonment, the total penalty attributed to the
child pornography charge would be a life sentence-in excess of the ten year
maximum authorized for the crime. However, the existence of the violation
leading to revocation was neither submitted to a jury, nor proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Therefore, the extended sentence was based on a fact not
found in accordance with Apprendi. However, the courts of appeals have heard
and rejected this argument, primarily reasoning that though "[s]upervised
release is imposed as part of the original sentence .. , the imprisonment that
ensues from revocation .. , is wholly derived from a different source" and
therefore should not be aggregated with the original term of imprisonment for
Apprendi purposes.
47
Part V of the Note argues that the findings by the courts of appeals in
avoiding the Apprendi problem are troublesome. The Supreme Court has
justified the lack of due process protections at revocation hearings by finding
41. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 713 (2000) (holding that § 3583(e)(3)
authorized the imposition of a period of supervised release after reicarceration, even before
subsection (h) had been added).
42. Id at 700.
43. Idat 701.
44. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2000) (holding that ajudge may not
enhance a criminal sentence based on any facts other than those decided by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt).
45. Id.
46. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 701 ("We therefore attribute postrevocation penalties to the
original conviction.").
47. United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States v.
Ellis, 33 F. App'x 150, 150 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[U]pon revocation of supervised release, the
imposition of a term of incarceration is permissible even if the resulting sentence, combined
with the sentence already served, exceeds the maximum sentence allowed for the substantive
offense.").
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revocation to be "part of the penalty for the initial offense."'48 However, the
courts of appeals have maneuvered around the Apprendi issue by adding
qualifiers to the Court's plain statement .4 9 The current state of the law suggests
that because the incarceration resulting from revocation is authorized by a
statute separate from the one providing the statutory maximum for the
underlying offense, Apprendi is not implicated .5 0 This Note will argue that this
rationale improperly elevates form over effect, and may have spawned double
jeopardy implications.
Part VI will discuss those supervised release issues specific to child sex
offenders. While much of the Note pertains to the federal supervised release
system as a whole, it is important to remember the drastic punishments awaiting
these particular offenders. The increased penalties have led to a variety of
policy concerns, largely as a result of the confusing and sometimes
contradictory legislative mandates handed down by Congress.
Part VII of this Note will suggest much-needed changes to the supervised
release system. While the goals of the legislation mandating enhanced periods
of supervised release for child sex offenders may be noble, the "due-process
lite" afforded these defendants is disconcerting. The suggestions will aim to
incorporate these goals while also attempting to provide increased protections
to the accused. Part VII will also highlight the strengths and weaknesses of
three separate proposals, and then demonstrate the practical application of each.
This Note will conclude by reexamining the constitutional issues presented
by the current supervised release system. It will also emphasize the policy
problems created by Congress through its often contradictory legislation.
Finally, the Note will end by stressing the need for a coherent framework
within which the federal supervised release system may accomplish its
legitimate goals without infringing on the rights of the accused.
II. A Brief Overview of the Supervised Release Revocation Process
Supervised release is very similar to probation, in that the subject must
abide by certain conditions provided by the sentencing court, and must report to
a probation officer whose duty it is to report any violations of those
48. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000).
49. See, e.g., McNeil, 415 F.3d at 277 (finding that though revocation is punishment for
the original conviction, the punishment is separate from the punishment provided by the statute
prohibiting the underlying offense).
5 0. Id
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conditions.5 ' However, the primary difference between the two systems is that
"probation is imposed instead of imprisonment, while supervised release is
imposed after imprisonent."52  According to the Second Circuit, this
difference-which, as will soon be demonstrated, is crucial-leads to the
ultimate conclusion that "the decision to grant or revoke parole only affects the
time served in prison within the parameters of the prison sentence originally
authorized by the crime of conviction[, whereas] [i]mprisonment for a violation
of supervised release .. . can exceed those parameters.,
5 3
The revocation process typically begins when the monitoring probation
officer files a petition to modify or revoke the terms of release based on an
alleged violation.5 Should the Government seek to detain the defendant while
he is awaiting the revocation hearing, a detention hearing must be held unless
waived by the defendant. 5 5 This detention hearing differs from one in the
typical pretrial setting in a very significant manner-the defendant, not the
Government, bears the burden of proof regarding flight risk and threat to the
community. 56To satisfy this burden, the defendant must prove the absence of
these factors by clear and convincing evidence. 57
A hearing will be held "to determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that a violation occurred."58 At this hearing, a defendant has the right to
appear, and may request permission to question adverse witnesses .59 Assuming
that the Government satisfies the probable cause standard at the probable cause
51. See Douglas A. Morris, Representing a Client Charged with Violating Conditions of
Supervised Release-Part I, CHAmpioN MAG., Nov. 2006, at 28 (describing the supervised
release process and providing general tips for those attorneys that may represent a client at a
supervised release revocation hearing).
52. United States v. Perez-Macias, 335 F.3d 421, 427 n. 13 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied,
540 U.S. 994 (2003) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 7, pt. A, introductory
cmnt. (2008)).
53. United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 276-77 (2d Cir. 2005).
54. Morris. supra note 51, at 28.
55. See id. at 29 (detailing the supervised release revocation process) (citing FED. R.
GRim. P. 32.l1(a)(1)).
56. Compare FED. R. GRIM. P. 32. 1(b)(6) (putting the burden of proof in a detention
hearing on the defendant), with United States v. Perez-Franco, 839 F.2d 867, 870 (1st Cir.
1988) ("The burden of persuading the court that [the defendant should be detained] ... rests
with the government.").
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3143 (2006).
58. United States v. Pelnsky, 129 F.3d 63,66 n.4 (2d Cit. 1997) (citing FED. R. CRIM. P.
32.1(b)).
59. See FED. R. RiuM. P. 32.1(b)(1)(B)(iii) (requiring the presiding judge to allow the
defendant an opportunity to question adverse witnesses, "unless the judge determines that the
interest ofjustice does not require the witness to appear").
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hearing, the revocation hearing must be held within a reasonable amount of
time.6
A defendant subject to a revocation hearing is entitled to several rights.
The defendant must receive written notice of the alleged violation of the terms
of release, and be notified of the right to retain counsel or to have counsel
appointed .6'1 Before the hearing, the Government's evidence against the
defendant must be disclosed .6  During a revocation hearing, the defendant
must be given the opportunity to appear, present evidence, and question
adverse witnesses .6 ' However, if the court determines that the interests of
justice do not require the appearance of a witness, the defendant may be denied
that opportunity.64
These statutory rights do not achieve the breadth of protection provided by
a guarantee of due process, and, as will be discussed later, the Supreme Court
has declined to require full due process protections during revocation
hearings .6 For example, as previously mentioned, a defendant's right to
question an adverse witness may be sacrificed if the court finds that the
appearance of the witness would not further the interests of justice. 66 In a
typical trial setting, this would likely violate the Confrontation Clause.6
Perhaps most notable, and worrisome, is that a revocation hearing does not
include the right to trial by jury.6 Also disconcerting is the fact that the
Government may discharge its burden of proof by satisfying only a
preponderance of the evidence standard .69 To further handicap the defendant,
60. Id. 32.1(b)(2).
61. Id. 32. 1(b)(2)(A), (D).
62. Id. 32. 1(b)(2)(B).
63. Id. 32.1(b)(2)(C).
64. Id.; see also United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 846 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that
the failure to allow the defendant to confront an adverse witness did not violate due process
because the Government showed good cause for not presenting the witness).
65. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984) (finding that revocation
hearings do not require full constitutional procedural protections); see also infra Part III
(examining the Court's treatment of supervised release in Johnson v. United States).
66. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.l(b)(2)(C); see also Martin, 382 F.3d at 846 (finding that if the
Government shows good cause, the court may refuse to allow the defendant to confront an
adverse witness).
67. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,51 (1987) ('The Confrontation Clause
provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: The right physically to face those
who testify against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination." (citing Delaware v.
Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1985) (per curiarn))).
68. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (stating that a revocation
hearing requires only a bench hearing).
69. See idi. (finding that supervised release revocation need only be based on a
363
364 7 WASH. &LEE L. REV 353 (2010)
hearsay evidence may be used in revocation hearings, and its admission does
not violate the Sixth Amendment.7 Compared to a full trial, the Government
not only has fewer restrictions, but also a burden of proof that is much easier to
satisfy.7'1 To use a football analogy, it is as if the Government (playing offense)
is able to use twice as many players as the defense, and only has to reach the
fifty-yard line to score a touchdown. This overwhelming advantage, when
viewed in light of the increased penalties under § 3583(k), is particularly
troublesome.
III. The Supreme Court Speaks on Supervised Release:
Johnson v. United States
The Supreme Court addressed the federal supervised release system in
Johnson v. United States. 72  While the specific issue in that case is not
particularly relevant to the topic of this Note, the Court engaged in a very
important general discussion of supervised release.7 In Johnson, the defendant
was convicted of a crime in 1993, and a three-year period of supervised release
was included as part of the sentence.7 Upon revocation, the district court
ordered that the defendant be incarcerated for eighteen months and imposed an
additional twelve-month term of supervised release.7 While this practice is
now authorized explicitly under § 3583(h), that section was not added until
1994--after the defendant's conviction.7 Johnson appealed, arguing that his
sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution," because
preponderance of the evidence standard).
70. See United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 691-92 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding that
hearsay evidence is admissible during revocation hearings); see also FED R. EvmD. 110 1(d)
(declaring that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in revocation hearings).
71. See supra Part II (discussing the limited procedural protections given to a defendant at
a revocation hearing).
72. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 713 (2000) (holding that § 3583(e)(3)
authorized the imposition of a period of supervised release after reincarceration, even before
subsection (h) had been added).
73. See id at 699-702 (discussing supervised release).
74. Id at 697.
75. Id at 698.
76. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h) (2006) ("When a term of supervised release is revoked and
the defendant is required to serve a term of imprisonment, the court may include a requirement
that the defendant be placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment."); see also
Johnson, 529 U.S. at 698 (explaining that subsection (h) was not added to § 3583 until 1994).
77. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9 (forbidding Congress from prosecuting a defendant for an
act committed before the act had been criminalized by statute).
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§ 3583 did not authorize the imposition of an additional term of supervised
release upon revocation until subsection (h) was added to the statute .7 ' The
Sixth Circuit agreed that no other part of the statute authorized the practice, but
still upheld the sentence .79  The court reasoned that there had been no
retroactive application of subsection (h), because the revocation of Johnson's
supervised release was punishment for his violation of the conditions of
supervised release .80 And because the violation took place after subsection (h)
had been added, it was not applied retroactively-and, therefore, there was no
ex post facto violation.
8'
The Supreme Court recognized that "this understanding of revocation of
supervised release has some intuitive appeal.",82  However, the Court also
recognized that if revocation were to be considered punishment for violating
the terms of release, many constitutional questions would be raised.8 The
Court described several of these constitutional issues. First, because revocation
can be based on conduct that is not actually criminal, it would be impossible to
impose a period of incarceration as punishment for that noncriminal behavior.84
Second, a defendant's right to due process would be violated, as no right to a
jury trial is guaranteed at a revocation, and only a preponderance of the
evidence standard is used.85  Should revocation be considered "new
punishment," due process would be required.8 Third, the Court noted that
"[w]here the acts of violation are criminal in their own right, they may be the
78. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 698 (2000).
79. See id (explaining that though the Sixth Circuit joined the majority of the federal
courts of appeals in finding that § 3583(e)(3) did not authorize a court to impose a new term of
supervised release following reincarceration, it would uphold the sentence on different
grounds).
80. Id. at 698-99.
81. See id. at 699 ("With no retroactivity, there could be no Ex Post Facto Clause
violation.").
82. Id at 700.
83. See id ("[S~erious constitutional questions. ., would be raised by construing
revocation and reimprisonment as punishment for the violation of the conditions of supervised
release.").
84. Id. But see infra note 269 (providing an analogous example where a defendant may
be incarcerated for activity that would typically be considered noncriminal, but becomes
criminal when in violation of a judicial order).
85. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (suggesting that due process
violations would occur if revocation were to be considered punishment for the violative acts
because there is no jury trial or reasonable doubt standard at revocation hearings).
86. See United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cur. 2005) (explaining that
because "a violation of supervised release is not a separate basis for criminal punishment," full
due process protections are not required).
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basis for separate prosecution, which would raise an issue of double
jeopardy."01 If a person is "punished" twice-once by way of revocation, and
again through a full prosecution-for the same criminal act, that person would
be "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" for the same offense.8 Taking these
concerns into account, the Court found that "[tlreating postrevocation sanctions
as part of the penalty for the initial offense. ... avoids these difficulties," and
therefore determined that postrevocation penalties should be attributed to the
original conviction.8
IV The Revocation of Supervised Release After Apprendi, Blakely, and
Booker
A. Apprendi v. New Jersey
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, defendant Apprendi was arrested for firing
several shots into the home of an African-American family that recently had
moved into a previously all-white neighborhood.90 Apprendi was charged with
the "possession of a firearm for an unlawfuil purpose," classified as a "second-
degree" offense under New Jersey law.9' As a result of this classification,
Apprendi faced between five and ten years imprisonment. 9 2  However, a
separate statute provided for an increased term of imprisonment if the trial
judge were to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "[tlhe defendant in
committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group
of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual
orientation, or ethnicity."9 3 Under this "hate-crime" provision, Apprendi faced
between ten and twenty years for each second-degree offense, or double that
which he would have faced otherwise. 94
Apprendi entered into a plea agreement, under which he pleaded guilty to
two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,
87. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700.
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V, ci. 2.
89. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700-01.
90. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000).
91. Id. at 468 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995)).
92. Id (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
93. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000).
94. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469 (explaining the effect of the 'bate-crime" provision on
the substantive charges facing the defendant) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN § 2C:43-7(a)(3) (West
Supp. 1999-2000)).
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as well as one count of a separate third-degree offense.95 As part of the plea
agreement, the State reserved the right to seek increased penalties under the
hate-crime provision for one count of the second-degree charge. 96 At the plea
hearing, the trial judge found sufficient evidence to accept the guilty pleas for
all counts.9
If the hate-crime enhancement did not attach, Apprendi faced a statutory
maximum of twenty years imprisonment-ten years for each count.98 However,
if the judge were to apply the enhancement, Apprendi faced a maximum of
thirty years imprisonment-twenty years for the enhanced count and ten for the
other.99 After an evidentiary hearing to determine Apprendi's purpose for the
shooting, in which both parties presented evidence, the judge found by a
preponderance of the evidence that the actions were made "with a purpose to
intimidate," and thus applied the hate-crime enhancement. 100 Based on these
findings, the trial judge sentenced Apprendi to a twelve-year term of
imprisonment for the enhanced second-degree offense and shorter terms for the
other counts. 101
Apprendi appealed the sentencing, arguing that due process required a
jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the bias upon which
his hate crime sentence was based.102 Upon reaching the Supreme Court, the
issue was presented as "whether the 12-year sentence imposed [for the
enhanced second-degree offense] was permissible, given that it was above the
1 0-year maximum for the offense."' 03 The Court, one year earlier, had declared
that "under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and
jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior
conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in
an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."004
Here, the Court concluded that the same due process requirements apply to the
95. Id. at 469-70.
96. I.at 470.
9 7. Id.
98. See id (providing the aggregate maximum sentences under New Jersey law without
the hate-crime enhancement). The sentence from the third-degree charge was to run
concurrently with the other sentences. Id
99. See id (providing the aggregate maximum sentences under New Jersey law including
the hate-crime enhancement).
100. Id. at47 1.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 474.
104. Id. at 476 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)).
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states under the Fourteenth Amendment.10 5 The Court later reiterated and
reapplied this holding in other cases, including Blakely v. Washington.1
06
B. Blakely v. Washington
Defendant Blakely pleaded guilty to kidnapping his estranged wife
admitting facts that supported a maximum sentence of fifty-three months.1O1
Blakely had been diagnosed with various personality disorders, and his wife
ultimately filed for divorce. 18In a misguided attempt to change her mind,
Blakely bound her arms with duct tape and forced her into a wooden box in the
bed of his pickup truck at knifepoint.'109 Despite the state's recommendation of
the maximum sentence of fifty-three months, the trial judge determined that an
exceptional sentence of ninety months was warranted. 10The increase was
based on a finding of "deliberate cruel~, a statutorily enumerated ground for
departure in domestic violence cases. M
Blakely objected to the increased sentence, and the judge then conducted a
three-day bench hearing featuring testimony from a variety of witnesses and
experts, including Blakely himself." 2  Based on this hearing, the judge
confirmed his initial determination that "deliberate cruelty" was satisfied, and
that a ninety-month sentence was therefore appropriate. 13 The Supreme Court
applied Apprendi's rationale in ruling that this exceptional sentence was
unconstitutional."1 
4
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed that "the 'statutory
maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted
105. See id. (extending to the states, via the Fourteenth Amendment, the Jones
determination that any fact that could increase the maximum penalty for a crime must be
submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt).
106. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (holding that "the 'statutory
maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant") (emphasis omnitted).




111. Id (citing WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (2000)).
112. Id.
113. Idat 301.
114. See id at 301-02 (reasoning that Apprendi clearly applied in this case, and therefore
the "deliberate cruelty" element must be submitted to a jury).
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by the defendant.""15 By preventing a judge from unilaterally imposing a
sentence in excess of the statutory maximum, the Court hoped "to give
intelligible content to the right of jury trial," and to "ensure[] the people's
ultimate control in the... judiciary."116 To summarize, after Apprendi and
Blakely, trial judges are, during sentencing, without discretion to utilize any
fact that was not found by a jury or admitted in a plea agreement by the
defendant.
C. Blakely in the Supervised Release Context
The position championed by the Court in these cases seemingly would be
quite applicable to supervised release schemes of all types. Using the facts of
Blakely, a parallel can be drawn easily between that case and one involving
supervised release. While the following hypothetical will use similar facts to
those in Blakely, it is important to keep in mind that the defendants facing the
supervised release scheme under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) are subject to far more
drastic penalties than under the standard supervised release scheme." 7 Assume
that Blakely had actually been sentenced to the maximum fifty-three month
sentence for kidnapping. Next, imagine that the judge imposed an additional
thirty-seven month term of supervised release, instead of attempting to enhance
the sentence by that length via a finding of "deliberate cruelty," as happened in
Blakely.' 8 Continuing the hypothetical, assume that immediately upon release
from the fifty-three month sentence, Blakely was accused of violating the terms
of his supervised release, and the judge held a bench hearing to determine
whether he should be re-incarcerated for the remaining thirty-seven months.
Comparing this hypothetical to the actual facts of Blakely described above,
one can immediately see several key similarities. In both situations the fifty-
three month sentence is uncontested by the defendant-only the potential
thirty-seven month addition is challenged as a violation of Apprendi. "9 In both
115. Id. at 303 (citing Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002)).
116. Idat305-06.
117. See 18 U. S.C. § 3 583(k) (2006) (increasing the range of potential supervised release
periods for child sex offenders from a maximum of five years to a maximum of life).
118. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 300 (2004) ("[Tlhe judge rejected the
State's recommendation and imposed an exceptional sentence of 90 months-37 months beyond
the standard maximum.").
119. See id at 301-02 (describing Blakely's argument in the language of Apprendi).
Blakely claimed that the judge's "sentencing procedure deprived him of his federal
constitutional right to have a jury determine beyond a reasonable doubt all facts legally essential
to his sentence." Id;see also Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466.476 (2000) ('[U]nder the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the. ... jury trial guarantees of the Sixth
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cases, the statutory maximum, based upon the facts admitted by the defendant
in the plea agreement, was fifty-three months, and in both cases, the defendant
faced a potential enhancement of thirty-seven months. And in both situations,
the potential enhancement was based upon a fact, either the existence of
"deliberate cruelty" or the violation of the terms of release, which would be
found by a judge in a bench hearing.
One need not engage in strenuous legal gymnastics to argue that both
scenarios should be deemed unconstitutional. After all, in Blakely, the Court
fervently stressed the importance that a jury determine any fact that would
increase a sentence beyond the statutory maximum:
The Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that before
depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the State should suffer
the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to "the unanimous
suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours," rather than a lone
employee of the State.' 2
0
Looking at the hypothetical scenario, the defendant was scheduled to be
incarcerated for only fifty-three months, within the acceptable range. However,
the problem arises when the supervised release is revoked, and another thirty-
seven months of imprisonment is imposed.'12 ' Granted, the revocation is based
on some new act, deemed to be a violation of the terms of release, but the
punishment for that act-incarceration-was authorized by the initial
sentence. 22 Had that initial sentence not included a term of supervised release,
no revocation (and thus no incarceration) would be possible. A situation is
presented in which the kidnapping charge, which carries a maximum sentence
of only fifty-three months given the facts admitted, has led to ninety months of
imprisonment, far more than authorized by the admitted facts, and seemingly in
violation of the rationale laid out in Apprendi and Blakely.
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a
crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable
doubt." (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999))).
120. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313-14 (citing WRIAM BLAcKsToNE, 3 CommENTARIEs 373-74,
379-81).
12 1. Cf id. at 300 (explaining that Blakely did not object to the original fifty-three month
sentence, but only to the imposition of the additional thirty-seven month period).
122. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) ("We ... attribute
postrevocation penalties to the original conviction.").
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D. The Courts of Appeals Reject the Apprendi Argument
Despite the clear commands of Apprendi and Blakely, not a single circuit
has adopted the above reasoning as it pertains to supervised release; in fact,
most of the courts of appeals have held the exact opposite-that the revocation
of supervised release does not implicate these cases or the concerns expressed
therein.123  Though the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on the
constitutionality of supervised release in the aftermath of Blakely, it recently
refused to grant certiorari in a case where the defendant presented this same
issue.'124 However, despite the near unanimity of result, the justifications put
forth by the courts of appeals have been scattered and somewhat inconsistent.
Both the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have determined that the Supreme
Court already has ruled implicitly on the issue. 125 In United States v. Booker,'26
the Court determined that the mandatory Federal Sentencing Guidelines were
123. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Faulks v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 38 (2007)
(No. 06-999) (claiming that "[elight federal courts of appeals have struggled with the
constitutionality of Section 3583(e)(3) in light of Blakely,' but have upheld the statute "[uln an
apparent effort to preserve broad judicial sentencing power").
124. See id. at 1- 12 (arguing that Apprendi and Blakely render unconstitutional those
supervised release periods in excess of the maximum sentence authorized by the statute for the
underlying offense).
125. See United States v. Faulks, 195 F. App'x 196, 198 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that the
Supreme Court had found, implicitly, that the federal supervised release system was
constitutional); United States v. Coleman, 404 F.3d 1103, 1104 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Among the...
provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that the Court recognized as constitutionally valid was
the supervised release statute.").
126. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227 (2005) (holding that the portions of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines that required mandatory application of the Guidelines must
be excised). In Booker, the Supreme Court considered the validity of the mandatory Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Id at 226. The Court determined that the mandatory Guidelines were
incompatible with its holding in Blakely and therefore held that the Guidelines could only be
applied in an advisory manner. Id. at 245. Booker, the defendant, was found to have possessed
"at least 50 grams of crack cocaine," based on evidence that he had just over ninety grams--this
crime carried a statutory maximum sentence of twenty-one years and ten months. Id. at 227.
However, the judge found by a preponderance of the evidence during the sentencing hearing
that Booker actually possessed an additional 566 grams. Id. Based on these new findings, the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines required a sentence of thirty years to life. Id. Because of the
mandatory nature of the Guidelines, the judge imposed a thirty-year sentence. Id However, the
Court found that Blakely applies to the Sentencing Guidelines, and therefore Booker could not
have been sentenced to more than the term authorized by his conviction-twenty-one years and
ten months. Id at 244. The Court went on to find that the Guidelines would be constitutional if
they were simply advisory and merely aided a judge in exercising his discretion within the
statutory range. Id at 233. Because of this determination, the portions of the Guidelines that
called for mandatory application were severed and excised, leaving only an advisory tool for
judges. Id. at 245.
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unconstitutional.'12 To remedy the problem, the Court ruled that the Guidelines
could be considered in an advisory capacity, but were no longer to be
considered as mandatory.12 8 In doing so, the Court stated that "we nevertheless
do not believe that the entire statute must be invalidated ... [as] [m]ost of the
statute is perfectly valid."02 9 Immediately thereafter, the Court cited several
examples of "valid" provisions, including § 3583 pertaining to supervised
release.130
Based on this general language, the Fourth Circuit matter-of-factly
concluded that the Court had considered the constitutionality of supervised
release in the wake of Blakely and found no violation.'13 1 This reasoning does
not consider adequately the context of the statement in Booker. The Court was
in the process of excising those parts of the Sentencing Guidelines that were
mandatory in nature. 132 Because supervised release has always been
discretionary, and not mandatory, the Court had no reason to include § 3583 in
those parts of the statute that were to be excised.13 3 It seems unlikely that the
Court intended to convey that it had considered fully the effects of App rendi
and Blakely on supervised release simply by including it as one of several
examples to illustrate a separate proposition.1
34
127. See id at 226-27 (finding that Blakely applies to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
rendering them unconstitutional). During sentencing, ajudge must determine whether certain
aggravating or mitigating factors are present. Id. Based on these factors, the sentencing range
under the Guidelines will increase or decrease accordingly. Id. When the Guidelines were
mandatory, a judge would be required to impose a sentence within the applicable sentencing
range. Id at 233-34. Because the new range may be above the statutory maximum for the
offense found by the jury or admitted by the defendant, the Guidelines were often in direct
conflict with Blakely. Id. at 243. To avoid this conflict, the Court ruled that the Guidelines may
function only in an advisory capacity. Id at 245.
128. Id.
129. Id at 258.
130. See id (listing the supervised release scheme set forth in § 3583 as a part of the
statute that is not mandatory, and is thus "perfectly valid").
131. See United States v. Faulks, 195 F. App'x 196, 198 (4th Cir. 2006) (employing the
language in Booker in reaching the conclusion that "there is no basis in law to support the
argument" that the supervised release statute is invalid).
132. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,246, 259 (2005) (finding that any conflict
with Blakely will be avoided if the Guidelines function only in an advisory capacity, and
asserting that even in this reduced role, the Guidelines will still serve their primary objective-
uniformity in sentencing).
133. See United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006) ("[T]he
revocation of supervised release and the subsequent imposition of additional imprisonment is,
and always has been, fully discretionary.").
134. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 258 (listing portions of the statute that remained unaffected
by the determination that the Guidelines were no longer to be considered mandatory). Along
with the supervised release system under § 3583, the Court cited 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551, 3552,
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Other circuits have put forth different reasons to justify the
constitutionality of the supervised release scheme. In United States v. Huerta-
Pimental,' the Ninth Circuit determined that no constitutional violation is
present because the revocation of supervised release is authorized by the
original conviction.136 The court found that the statute specifying the statutory
maximum for the underlying offense authorizes the trial judge to apply § 3583
and impose a period of supervised release to be served post-incarceration.137 In
that case, for example, the defendant pleaded guilty to attempting to enter the
United States illegally and was sentenced to sixty-three months in prison under
§ 1326. 138 This guilty plea allowed § 3583 to "kick in," authorizing the judge
to impose an additional three-year period of supervised release.13 9  Upon
revocation of his supervised release, the defendant was sentenced to serve
another two years in jail, for a total period of eighty-seven months-seemingly
in excess of the maximum authorized by his plea arrangement under § 1326 .140
However, the court found that "supervised release .. , is part of the original
sentence authorized by conviction."14'1 Because the three-year period of
supervised release was "a part" of the original sixty-three month sentence, it
should not be added to the end of that sentence in determining the length of
punishment, and therefore no Apprendi violation existed at the time of the
original sentencing.14 2
The First Circuit reached the same conclusion as its sister circuits in
United States V. Work.'14' The court also found that a conviction or guilty plea
3554, and 3555 as examples of those portions of the Guidelines that did not need to be severed.
Id. Section 3551 provides a description of authorized sentences, and the others deal with
presentence reports, forfeiture, and notification to victims, respectively. Id.
135. See United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that Apprendi is not implicated by a supervised release period that extends beyond the
statutory maximum for the underlying offense, because supervised release is merely a part of the
initial sentence).
136. See id (finding no Sixth Amendment violation under Apprendi and Blake ly).
137. See id. at 1223 ("Section 3583, one of several statutes that together govern the federal
criminal sentencing structure, authorizes the imposition of supervised release upon conviction of
a qualify'ing offense.").
138. Id at 1221.
139. Id at 1222.
140. See id (summarizing the defendant's argument).
141. Id at 1223.
142. See id at 1224 (concluding that the "district court's imposition of supervised release
simply fails to engage Apprendi" because the defendant was not "exposed. ... to additional
punishment above the statutory maximum").
143. See United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 486 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that no
Apprendi violation occurred).
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under a statute would enable a trial judge to attach a period of supervised
release under § 3583.'44 In Work, the defendant was sentenced to a term of
thirty-eight months for an offense that carried a maximum of forty-one
months.145 His supervised release was later revoked, and he was subject to an
additional fourteen months of incarceration. '46 The defendant argued that he
could only be sentenced to an additional three months, as his conviction
authorized a maximum of forty-one months imprisonment.14 7  The court
rejected this argument.14 8 Like the Ninth Circuit, the First Circuit found that
"[t]he reference to supervised release as being 'part of the sentence' does not
mean that a federal criminal sentence must be aggregated for all purposes."149
The court then determined that the thirty-eight month sentence was within the
forty-one month maximum as provided by the statute, and that the fourteen-
month sentence was within the range authorized by § 3583.150 As such, both
sentences need not be aggregated, but may be looked at separately in relation to
the statute authorizing that setne 5
The Second Circuit has noticed the potential constitutional issues
presented by the supervised release system in light of Apprendi and Blakely. 112
144. See id. at 489 ("[T]he conviction authorizes the court to 'include as a part of the
sentence a requirement that the defendant be placed on a tern of supervised release after
imprisonment."' (quoting 18 U.S.C § 3583(a) (2006))).
145. Id at 488.
146. Id
147. See id. (explaining the defendant's argument that the revocation of supervised release
would violate Apprendi).
148. See id ("This argument is more cry than wool.").
149. Id. at 489.
150. See id at 490-91 (finding that because both portions of the original sentence were
within the permissible ranges provided by the relevant statute, the statutory maximum was not
exceeded and no Apprendi violation occurred).
151. See id at 490 ("[Wjhen determining whether a sentence exceeds the maximum
permissible under the Constitution, each aspect of the sentence must be analyzed separately."
(citing United States v. Barnes, 251 F.3d 251, 260-61 (1 st Cir. 2001))).
152. See United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273,277 (2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the effects
of Blakely and Booker on the federal supervised release system). The Second Circuit noted that
"Blakely suggests that the discretionary decision to grant or revoke parole is distinct from
sentencing and does not suffer from the analogous Sixth Amendment infirmity." Id. at 276.
However, the court went on to state that this suggestion does not necessarily mean that
supervised release is also constitutional under Blakely:
[Plarole (unlike supervised release) is an interval during which the defendant could
continue to be held in prison based on his original conviction alone; so the decision
to grant or revoke parole only affects the time served in prison within the
parameters of the prison sentence originally authorized by the crime of conviction.
Id at 276-77.
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The court recognized that "the supervised release scheme is in some tension
with the rationale of Blakely and Booker."153 However, the court ultimately
followed the other circuits in refusing to find a constitutional violation.154 The
Second Circuit agreed, albeit hesitantly, that "[tjhough supervised release is
'part of the penalty for the initial offense,' the imposition of supervised release
and the sanctions for violation are authorized by a statute ... that is separate
from the regime that governs incarceration for the original offense."155
Regardless of the reasoning, it appears that the Supreme Court is satisfied
with the results reached by the courts of appeals. In 2007, the Court refused to
grant certiorari to a case out of the Fourth Circuit that clearly presented the
Apprendi issue as it pertains to supervised release. 156 Thus, to summarize the
current state of the law, the imposition of supervised release is authorized by
the underlying offense. '57 However, a separate statute actually governs the
supervised release sentence.158  Because of this statutory separation, no
Apprendi violation occurs even if the length of the term of incarceration, when
Because supervised release sentences may affect time outside the scope of these authorized
parameters, it presents a different issue. Id. at 277. However, despite noticing that "the
supervised release scheme is in some tension with the rationale of Blakely and Booker," and that
"if a sentence for violation of supervised release were nothing but a sentencing enhancement,
beyond the punishment justified by the conviction, it could be constitutionally infirm," the court
chose to follow the other circuits and uphold the constitutionality of the federal supervised
release system in the face of Blakely and Booker. Id at 276-77.
153. Id at 276.
154. See id. at 277 ("We are not inclined to extend the sweep of Booker and Blakely to an
area of law [supervised release] that is up to now undisturbed.").
155. Id. (citing Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000)).
156. See Faulks v. United States, 195 F. App'x 196 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
38 (2007) (refusing to review the decision of the Fourth Circuit that held that the supervised
release scheme was unaffected by Blakely). This camne as somewhat of a surprise, as the case
was mentioned as a "Petition with a 'Reasonable' Chance of Being Granted" by the website
"SCOTUSblog," and the specific issue had garnered attention elsewhere in the blogosphere.
Sentencing Law and Policy, June 5, 2007, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencingjawA_and
_policy/2007/06/wil1_scotus tak.html (last visited Jan. 28,2010) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Second Circuit Blog, July 21, 2005, http://circuit2.blogspot.com~search?
q=robinson (last visited Feb. 9, 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
157. See United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 489 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[Tlhe conviction
authorizes the court to 'include as a part of the sentence a requirement that the defendant be
placed on a term of supervised release after imprisonment."' (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a)
(2006))).
158. See id. at 490 (concluding "that when determining whether a sentence exceeds the
maximum permissible under the Constitution, each aspect of the sentence must be analyzed
separately"); United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[T]he imposition of
supervised release and the sanctions for violation are authorized by a statute and Guidelines
scheme that is separate from the regime that governs incarceration for the original offense.").
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combined with the length of the original sentence, exceeds the statutory
maximum for the underlying offense on which the conviction was based." 9
V Reconciling Apprendi and Blakely with Johnson-at the Expense of the
Defendant
The importance of Apprendi , Blakely, and Johnson, as well as subsequent
decisions by the courts of appeals-and the overall effect they have on the
federal supervised release systemn-cannot be appreciated fully unless viewed
together. By viewing these holdings in relation to one another, one can see
quite clearly the lengths to which the federal judiciary has gone to avoid
declaring the supervised release system unconstitutional. In doing so, the
courts have sacrificed the most fundamental rights of criminal defendants.
A. Revocation is Punishment for the Initial Offense
(Sort of, Kind of, Maybe)
In Johnson, the Court determined that the revocation of supervised release
was not to be considered punishment for violating the terms of release, but as
part of the original conviction.16 0 This decision was based largely on the desire
to "avoid" the constitutional difficulties that would come with a ruling that
revocation was indeed punishment for a violative act. 16' The Court provides
hardly any legal argument for its finding other than this desire to preserve the
system's constitutionality.162  Certainly, the Court does have a policy of
159. See United States v. Ellis, 33 F. App'x 150,150 (4th Cir. 2002) ("[U]pon revocation
of supervised release, the imposition of a term of incarceration is permissible even if the
resulting sentence, combined with the sentence already served, exceeds the maximum sentence
allowed for the substantive offense."); United States v. Cenna, 448 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11 th Cur.
2006) (relying on the "well-settled rule that a term of supervised release may be imposed in
addition to the statutory maximum term of imprisonment"); cf 3 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 536.1 (2004) (explaining that "the term of supervised
release .. , does not replace part of the term of incarceration, but is imposed in addition to the
incarceration term," and, therefore, may extend beyond the statutory maximum for the original
offense).
160. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 701 ("We ... attribute postrevocation penalties to the
original conviction.").
161. See id at 700 (finding that "[tireating postrevocation sanctions as part of the
penaly... avoids these [constitutional] difficulties").
162. See id. at 700-01 (offering only a 1968 summary affirmance of a district court
decision concerning parole as support for the finding that postrevocation penalties should be
attributed to the original conviction).
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favoring those interpretations that allow for a law to be deemed
constitutional.163 But this policy should not override the constitutional concerns
of those defendants facing a loss of liberty at a revocation hearing, especially in
the case of defendants facing not just two or three years of reimprisonment, but
lifetime reimprisonent.'64 Nonetheless, the Court avoided requiring full due
process protections at revocation hearings by simply stating that revocation and
reimprisonment are authorized by the original sentence.'6
Because the Johnson Court decided to "attribute postrevocation penalties
to the original conviction," 166 one logically would think that a term of
imprisonment imposed as a result of revocation would be added to the length of
the original period of imprisonment to determine the total time of incarceration.
To put it differently-if the reimprisonment is not punishment for violating
supervised release, it must be punishment for the original offense. The
Johnson Court even stated that postrevocation sanctions should be treated "as
part of the penalty for the initial offense."16 7 However, after the holding in
Blakely, this language was not taken at face value.168 Instead, the courts of
appeals determined that because the two periods of incarceration (the initial
period and the imprisonment resulting from revocation) were authorized by
separate statutes, they could exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying
offense when combined.169
This result seems to be in friction with the Court's pronouncement that
"the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect."'17 0 The "effect" of the
163. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 996 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court is "bound to first consider whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible that would avoid the constitutional question" (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422
U.S. 205, 216 (1975))).
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (requiring that defendants convicted under this
section be subject to a minimum of five years supervised release with a maximum of lifetime
supervised release, as opposed to a maximum of five years for most other crimes).
165. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (avoiding the issues of
constitutionality by attributing postrevocation penalties to the original conviction).
166. Idat 701.
167. Idat 700.
168. See, e.g., United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that
"[tlhough supervised release is 'part of the penalty for the initial offense,"' the length of the
supervised release period is not combined with the length of the original sentence for Blakely
purposes).
169. See id (finding that "[slupervised release ... is wholly derived from a different
source" and therefore "imprisonment for violation of supervised release may exceed the time
that the defendant could have been jailed on his original conviction" (citing United States v.
Wirth, 250 F.3d 165, 170 n.3 (2d Cir. 2001))).
170. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,494 (2000).
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current regime is to expose defendants to periods of incarceration in excess of
the statutory maximum for the offense committed.'17 ' Remembering from above
the hypothetical based on the facts of Blakely, one can see that the defendant
was subject to only fifty-three months imprisonment based on the guilty
verdict.172 However, after serving the initial term, another thirty-seven months
of incarceration could be imposed upon revocation-attributable to the original
conviction. 17 The "effect" of this scenario is that the defendant will serve
ninety months "as part of the penalty for the initial offense."174 If the "relevant
inquiry is one not of form,"17 5 should it matter that incarceration is based on
two statutes as opposed to just one?
B. Out of the Frying Pan, into the Double Jeopardy Clause?
Jeopardy does not attach during a revocation hearing.17 6 Therefore, if a
criminal act is the basis for revocation (as it must be under § 3583(k)), 717 the
Government may first seek the revocation of the defendant's supervised
release.17 8  Because jeopardy does not attach during this process, double
jeopardy does not bar the Government from later prosecuting the defendant for
the underlying crime that was the basis for revocation. 
17 9
171. See, e.g., McNeil, 415 F.3d at 274-75 (requiring the defendant to serve forty-eight
months in prison where the statutory maximum for the original offense was forty-one months);
United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 486-87 (1 st Cir. 2005) (requiring a defendant to serve a
total of fifty-two months in prison where the statutory maximum for the original offense was
forty-one months).
172. See supra Part IV.C (drawing a parallel between the facts of Blakely and a similar
situation involving supervised release).
173. United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 694, 701 (2000) (attributing supervised release
revocation to the original conviction).
174. Id. at 700.
175. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494.
176. See DAviD S. RunsTEiN, DOUBLE JEOPARDY: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED
STATEs CoNsrrruION 62 (2004) ("[Revocation of supervised release] does not constitute a new
criminal prosecution of the offender ... [which means] an offender facing the revocation of his
supervised release .. . is not in 'jeopardy."').
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) ("If a defendant ... commits any [applicable]
criminal offense .. , the court shall revoke the term of supervised release.").
178. See, e.g., United States v. Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 244-45 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that a
revocation hearing does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same act).
179. See RLJDsTEIN, supra note 176, at 62 ("[Amn offender can be prosecuted for a criminal
offense based upon the same act that served as the basis for a hearing to revoke his supervised
release.").
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However, the federal courts may have worked their way into a different
double jeopardy problem while maneuvering around the Apprendi issue. Once
again, it is important to remember that the Supreme Court has determined that
supervised release-both its imposition and revocation-is "part of the penalty
for the initial offense."' 80 Therefore, revocation is indeed punishment-though
it is punishment for the initial offense and not the act that precipitates the
revocation hearing.'18'
Consider once again the situation facing Dr. McElheney. The ten-year
sentence is clearly punishment for possessing child pornography. 182 If, upon
having completed the prison sentence, his lifetime supervised release is
revoked, the resulting imprisonment will also be considered punishment for his
initial possession of child pornography offense.'8" As seen earlier, the courts of
appeals have recognized this as fact, while at the same time rejecting the
Apprendi argument. 84 This rejection is based on the rationale that "the
imposition of supervised release and the sanctions for violation are authorized
by a statute and Guidelines scheme that is separate from the regime that
governs incarceration for the original offense."185  Therefore, the federal
judiciary has recognized that a defendant like Dr. McElheney is punished by
180. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000).
181. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1168 (8th ed. 2004) (defining penalty as "punishment
imposed on a wrongdoer").
182. Id (stating that penalties are usually imposed "in the form of imprisonment" for "a
wrong to the state").
183. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 701 ("'We ... attribute postrevocation penalties to the
original conviction.").
184. See, e.g., United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) (relying on the
Johnson decision in recognizing that supervised release is a part of the punishment for the
original crime).
185. Id. In McNeil, the court justified the division of the initial punishment with three
reasons. Id. First, as previously mentioned, supervised release is based on a different statute
than the penalty for the substantive criminal offense. Id. Second, "the imprisonment that ensues
from revocation is partly based on new conduct." Id. Third, the court found that supervised
release serves different interests than those served by the imprisonment for the initial offense.
Id. However, the last two reasons are inapplicable when dealing with double jeopardy. The
Supreme Court has made clear that revocation is not punishment for the "new conduct" and that
revocation should be associated only with the initial offense. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700
(finding that treating revocation as punishment for the violative act would raise serious
constitutional concerns, and therefore revocation should be attributed to the original
conviction). The Court also has stated explicitly that the differing interests served by two
statutes "is of no moment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, the text of which looks to
whether the offenses are the same, not the interests that the offenses violate." United States v.
Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 699 (1993). Therefore, for the ensuing double jeopardy discussion, the
only relevant reason for the separation of punishments is that they are authorized by separate
statutes.
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two separate statutes for committing a crime: The statute for the underlying
offense and the supervised release statute.'1
86
The Double Jeopardy Clause protects not only against multiple
prosecutions for the same offense, but also "against multiple punishments for
the same offense."' 87 To enforce the latter protection, the Court has relied on
the "same-elements" test.' 88 This test is applied to "determine whether there are
two offenses or only one." 189  If there are two separate offenses, two
punishments are permissible, but if only one offense was committed, the
defendant may be punished only once.'190 In deciding whether the defendant
committed one or two offenses, the courts must look to see if the individual
statutes each "require[] proof of a fact which the other does not." 19' In United
States v. Dixon,192 the Court consolidated two cases, and applied the same-
elements test to each. Defendant Foster was found guilty of contempt for
violating a restraining order against his wife after the court found that he had
assaulted her.'93 The Government was later allowed to prosecute Foster for
assault with the intent to kill, because the first offense contained an element
that the latter did not (knowledge of the restraining order) and the latter offense
required proof of an element (that the defendant possessed the intent to kill)
that the first offense did not.'19 4 This situation passes the same-elements test.19
186. Cf Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (establishing that supervised
release is punishment for the initial offense); McNeil, 415 F.3d at 277 (explaining that while
supervised release is punishment for the initial offense, it is separate from the punishment
imposed by the statute for the underlying crime).
187. See RuDsTEIN, supra note 176, at 155 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 717 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989)).
188. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (clarifying that "where the two
offenses for which the defendant is punished .. . cannot survive the 'same-elements' test, the
double jeopardy bar applies").
189. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
190. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696 (explaining that double jeopardy prohibits multiple
punishments for the same offense).
191. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304.
192. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993) (holding that the Blockburger
same-elements test is the sole test for determining whether a defendant has been subject to
multiple punishments or prosecutions for the same offense).
193. See id. at 693 (describing the facts that led to the appeal by respondent Foster, whose
case had been combined with respondent Dixon's for review by the Supreme Court).
194. See id at 701-02 (finding that each offense contained elements that the other did not,
and therefore punishment was not barred by double jeopardy).
195. See id. at 701 ("Applying the Blockburger elements test, the result is clear: These
crimes were different offenses.").
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Defendant Dixon was released from prison on bail awaiting trial for
second-degree murder.'19 6 The conditions of his release provided that he could
not commit any crimes while on release; the punishment for a violation of this
condition would constitute criminal contempt.197  While on release, the
defendant was arrested and indicted for the possession of cocaine.198 Based on
the indictment, the defendant was found guilty of criminal contempt in an
expedited proceeding without a jury, and sentenced to 180 days in jail.'99 The
defendant then moved to dismiss the cocaine possession indictment on double
jeopardy grounds to prevent any subsequent prosecution for that offense.20
The Supreme Court found that the indictment should be dismissed, as a
further punishment for the cocaine possession would fail the same-elements test
and violate the Double Jeopardy Clause .2 0' Here, the criminal contempt statute
was triggered because the defendant violated one of the conditions of his
release-he committed a crime by possessing cocaine. 0 The same exact
elements proven in the contempt proceeding would once again be at issue in
any subsequent prosecution for cocaine possession. 0 Basically, the Court
found that the defendant committed only one offense-possession of cocaine-
and that this offense could justify' only one prosecution, for either contempt or
cocaine possession. 2 04
This same reasoning should apply to the supervised release system. The
imposition of supervised release is justified by the conviction for the initial
offense .2 05 This imposition does not require the Government to prove any fact
that was not proven during the conviction--only that an offense was





200. Id at 692.
201. See id at 700 ("Because Dixon's drug offense did not include any element not
contained in his previous contempt offense, his subsequent prosecution violates the Double
Jeopardy Clause.").
202. See id at 698 ("[The contempt sanction [was] imposed for violating the order
through commission of the incorporated drug offense.").
203. See id. at 700 ("Dixon's drug offense did not include any element not contained in his
previous contempt offense.").
204. See id (finding that due to the defendant's previous prosecution for contempt, he
could not be prosecuted for cocaine possession because the two statutes failed the same-
elements test).
205. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. at 694, 701 (2000) (finding that
postrevocation penalties are attributed to the original conviction).
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2006) (authorizing a court to impose supervised release as
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supervised release, the court did not find any element separate firom those
needed to conclude that he was guilty of possessing child pornography. 0 The
208
supervised release period was punishment for Dr. McElheney's conviction.
Clearly, the ten-year period of incarceration was also punishment for the
conviction .209 These punishments, as the courts of appeals have confirmed, are
based on separate statutes .2 10  Therefore, it seems that supervised release
defendants are subject to two punishments for one offense. This is in clear
contradiction of the Court's mandate that the Double Jeopardy Clause
"1protection applies both to successive punishments and to successive
prosecutions for the same criminal offense."
21'
VI. Problems Specific to the Child Sex Offender Context
Until now, the issues presented in this Note have related to the federal
supervised release system in general. These issues certainly pertain to those
defendants, like Dr. McElheney, who are subject to the enhanced terms of
supervised release under § 3583(k).212 Although the issues are equally as
constitutionally problematic, they are more problematic in a practical sense for
these defendants than for others because of the drastically longer sentences
involved.21 Putting those issues aside, several serious difficulties arise as a
result of the "five to life" scheme under subsection (k).
part of the sentence for any federal conviction). The prosecutor need not prove any fact other
than the conviction. Id.
207. See United States v. McElheney, 524 F. Supp. 2d 983, 996 (E.D. Tenn. 2007) (noting
simply that "[tihe offense of conviction carries a maximum term of supervised release of any
term of years or life").
208. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700 (finding that postrevocation sanctions should be treated
'las part of the penalty for the initial offense").
209. See McElheney, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 986 (finding that an appropriate sentence will,
among other things, "provide just punishment").
210. See United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) (explaining that
supervised release is "wholly derived from a different source" than the punishment for the
substantive offense).
211. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (emphasis added) (citing North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969)).
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (authorizing supervised release periods from a
minimum of five years to a maximum of life for those defendants convicted of one of the
enumerated child sex offenses).
213. Compare id (authorizing periods of supervised release ranging in length from five
years to life), with id § 3 583(b) (authorizing a maximum term of five years supervised release,
except as otherwise provided).
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Hopefully, a defendant convicted of a child sex offense will be
rehabilitated after the initial prison sentence, and supervised release can simply
214function as a tool in reintroducing the defendant into mainstream society.
Unfortunately, the revocation of supervised release does occur2 5-and if
Congress is correct about the high recidivism rates of sexual offenders, 26one
must expect that revocation of these extended terms of supervised release will
occur relatively frequently.
For revocation under § 3583(k), a defendant must first have been subject
to the extended period of supervised release because of a conviction for one of
the enumerated child sex offenses. 1 For instance, Dr. McElheney received a
period of lifetime supervised release because of his guilty plea to possession of
child pornography. 1 However, revocation cannot occur under this section for
a mere violation of the terms of is supervised release-instead, Dr. McEIlieney
would have to again commit a crime enumerated under § 3583(k) .2 19 It is
absolutely inarguable that a second-time sex offender should be punished very
harshly-this Note will not dispute that proposition. It does, however, submit
that the supervised release system is not the proper vehicle to achieve that
objective.
214. See United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2006)
(characterizing the congressional policy behind supervised release as the desire to provide a
mechanism that "improve[s] the odds of a successful transition from the prison to liberty" (citing
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 696-97 (2000))).
215. See, e.g., id. (describing the revocation of Huerta-Pimental's supervised release, and
subsequent imposition of imprisonment for twenty-four months); United States v. Faulks, 195 F.
App'x 196, 197 (4th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the defendant was appealing "the district
court's order revoking her supervised release and sentencing her to thirty-six months'
imprisonment"); United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847, 849 (3d Cir. 2006) (describing the
revocation of the defendant's supervised release, and the imposition of seventy-two months of
imprisonment).
216. See H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 49-50 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 684
(justifying the increased periods of supervised release for child sex offenders because these
offenders may have "deep-seated aberrant sexual disorders that are not likely to disappear within
a few years of release from prison").
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (requiring revocation of supervised release and
imprisonment of not less than five years for any defendant that is "required to register under
[SORNA]" and that commits one of the enumerated felony sex offenses).
218. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (explaining that while Dr. McElheney
actually was charged with "knowingly receiving" child pornography, for the purposes of this
Note it will be assumed that he had been charged with "possessing" child pornography).
219. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (requiring that "[ilf a defendant [subject to
§ 35 83(k)] ... commits any [applicable] criminal offense" under this statute, supervised release
shall be revoked and imprisonment imposed for not less than five years).
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A. Revocation or Prosecution?: A Problem of Conflicting Statutes
Assume that Dr. McElheney, upon the completion of his prison sentence,
is found in possession of child pornography for a second time. Under 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2), a second offense for possession is punishable by ten to
twenty years imprisonment. 220 In the same act that introduced subsection (k),
Congress determined that a maximum of twenty years was the proper
punishment for a second-time offender .22 ' However, because under § 3583(k)
"the court shall revoke the term of supervised release and require the defendant
to serve a term of imprisonment" equal to the length of the supervised release
period, Dr. McElheney could instead spend the rest of his life in prison. 2 By
allowing a steeper punishment for a second offense via the revocation process
than that intended by Congress, the system undermines legislative intent.
Perhaps Congress never intended defendants such as Dr. McElheney to
receive the maximum amount of supervised release. Because the possession of
child pornography is one of the least serious crimes included under § 3583(k),
it would make sense if the minimum period of supervised release-five years-
were the standard punishment. 2 However, because of the Sentencing
Guidelines policy statement, many courts are opting to impose a much harsher
punishment. 2 Courts now must choose either to follow the policy statement of
Congress and impose lifetime supervised release-or to accept Congress's
recognition that a repeat offender under § 2252A(b)(2) does not deserve a
lifetime in prison.
The twenty-year maximum under § 2252A(b)(2) is in danger of becoming
a dead-letter. Even if the Government were to prosecute a defendant
successfully under that statute, the resulting conviction would mean that the
Government also is virtually assured of a successful revocation .22" If the
220. Id § 2252A(b)(2).
22 1. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-2 1, § 103(a)(l)(E)(ii), 117 Stat. 650, 652 (codified as 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2)) (changing the penalty for a second violation of § 2252A(b)(2) from a
maximum of ten years to a maximum of twenty years).
222. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006).
223. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (suggesting that the offenses included under
§ 3583 vary in severity, and that the supervised release sentences should reflect the differing
degrees of seriousness).
224. See cases cited supra note 33 (providing examples of courts using the policy statement
to justify lifetime periods of supervised release for relatively less serious offenses under
§ 3583(k)).
225. See supra Part 11 (explaining how much easier it is for the Government to revoke
supervised release than to convict a defendant during a full-scale trial).
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revocable term of supervised release is longer than twenty years, § 2252A(b)(2)
is essentially superfluous. 2 Basic statutory interpretation insists that "force
should be given to those clauses which would make the statute in harmony with
the other legislation on the subject, and which would tend most completely to
secure the rights of all persons affected by such legislation. 2 2 1 Construing the
supervised release scheme under § 3583(k) as encouraging lifetime periods of
supervised release for second-time possessors of child pornography is not in
harmony with the lesser penalties provided by § 2252A(b)(2). And subjecting
an offender to an extended period of incarceration without the full due process
protections that would be provided at trial is certainly not the most effective
way to "secure the rights of all such persons affected" by the statute.22
B. The Federal Prosecutor's Predicament
The increased periods of supervised release also pervert the role of the
federal prosecutor. Under the standard system, supervised release periods are
capped at five years for Class A felonies-those crimes carrying a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment or death.22 Imagine a situation where a
defendant, convicted of a Class A felony, serves his initial period of
incarceration. After release, and while serving his period of supervised release,
the defendant murders another person. In this situation, even if the prosecutor
elects to pursue revocation and imprisonment for the five-year term, the
prosecutor will almost certainly also prosecute the defendant for murder. Here,
the full-blown prosecution would result in a much more serious penalty, likely
life imprisonment or death, as opposed to merely five years from revocation."
Compare the above scenario with that presented by § 3583(k). Assume
once again that Dr. McElheney was sentenced to ten years for possession of
child pornography, and that he also received a period of lifetime supervised
226. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (2006) (providing for a maximum sentence of twenty
years for a repeat offender of the statute prohibiting the possession of child pornography). If a
defendant is already subject to incarceration for a period of twenty or more years based on the
revocation supervised release, there is no additional benefit to prosecuting the defendant under
§ 2252A.
227. HENRY CAMPBELL BLAcK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF
THE LAws 61 (1896).
228. Id.
229. See 18 U. S.C. § 3 583 (b) (2006) (limiting supervised release for Class A felonies to a
maximum of five years); see also id § 3559(a)(1) (classifying those offenses punishable by a
maximum of life in prison or death as Class A felonies).
230. See id § 1111 I(b) ("Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished
by death or by imprisonment for life.").
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release. If, upon his release, he should again be found in possession of child
pornography, the prosecutor has a choice. He could either prosecute Dr.
McElheney for a second offense under § 2252A(5) in a full trial, or he could
attempt to revoke the lifetime period of supervised release. Unlike the first
scenario, a full-blown prosecution would result in a lighter sentence-a
maximum of twenty years-as opposed to lifetime incarceration resulting from
revocation. 231A prosecutor who is successful in revocation would have no
motivation to then seek an actual conviction for the second offense, rendering
§ 2252A impotent.
The possibility of a harsher sentence would not be the only enticement for
a prosecutor to pursue revocation instead of prosecution. As described earlier,
the Government has a tremendous advantage over the defendant in supervised
release revocation hearings. 22Having to prove to ajudge by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant committed a crime is much less daunting
than having to prove beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury that the same
defendant committed that crime.23 If the Government can send the defendant
away for life with little effort, why would it expend additional effort and
resources for a completely superfluous punishment? In effect, § 3583(k) will
often lead to revocation hearings simply replacing the prosecution of repeat
offenders subject to the statute. Deference to the legislature may be admirable
in many situations, but certainly not when the statutory scheme put in place by
Congress allows for the complete circumvention of the due process protections
offered by the tried-and-true adversarial criminal justice system.
The federal prosecutor is not to blame for this predicament. It is not
suggested that only a lazy prosecutor looking for a shortcut, or an overzealous
prosecutor with a "win-at-all-costs" mentality would opt for revocation instead
of prosecution in the above scenario. In fact, any prosecutor who is faithfully
following directives would be led down this route. For example, Assistant
United States Attorneys (AUSAs) are directed to "[c]onsider the sentence ...
that is likely to be imposed if prosecution is successful, and whether such a
sentence .. . would justify the time and effort of prosecution. 3 AUSAs are
also instructed to determine if the revocation of probation or parole would
231. Compare id. § 225 2A(b)(2) (providing for a maximum sentence of twenty years for a
second conviction for possession of child pornography), with id § 35 83(k) (authorizing the
revocation of the full term of supervised release, which in the case of Dr. McElheney is life).
232. See supra Part 11 (describing the supervised release process, and explaining the
Government's advantage over the defendant in revocation hearings).
233. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text (describing the less-than-complete due
process protections available to a defendant during a revocation hearing).
234. UNITED STATES ATroRNEYS' uAL tit. 9, ch. 27.230(B) cmt. 8 (1997).
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235better serve the public interest than would a new prosecution. Finally,
federal prosecutors are advised that "[tlhe defendant should be charged with the
most serious offense .. . that is readily provable. Ordinarily ... this will be the
offense for which the most severe penalty is provided.0 36 As described earlier,
the Government would have a much higher chance of "winning" at a revocation
hearing than at trial, and the sentence would often be harsher. 3 A prosecutor
who is merely discharging her duties should almost always opt for the
revocation route, because substantially less effort would be required to "better
serve the public interest" by obtaining "the most severe penalty" available.
VII. Where to Go from Here?: Three Potential Solutions
The supervised release system is not without merit. The noble objective of
the system is to "improve the odds of a successful transition [by a prisoner]
from the prison to liberty."'2 38 However, this objective cannot be the rationale
behind a supervised release scheme that authorizes-and encourages-lifetime
terms of supervised release.23 If a defendant is never freed from supervision,
then supervised release is no longer a method of transition, but is an end in
itself. There is no "liberty" at the end of the tunnel for a defendant subject to
lifetime supervised release.
So what is the rationale behind the increased terms of supervised release?
As mentioned at the beginning of this Note, Congress succinctly described its
motivation. 2 40 The ration ale behind § 3583(k) stems from the belief that sex
offenders may suffer from "deep-seated aberrant sexual disorders that are not
likely to disappear within a few years of release from prison."24 ' To respond to
235. See id. ("[T]he prosecutor should consider whether the public interest might better be
served by instituting a proceeding for violation of probation or revocation of parole, than by
commencing a new prosecution.").
236. Id. at ch. 27.300(B) cmt.
237. See supra Part VI.B (illustrating, in the eyes of a prosecutor, the relative desirability
of a revocation hearing as compared to a fu~ll-scale prosecution).
238. United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2006).
239. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (requiring defendants charged with crimes included
under § 3583(k) to serve a minimum of five years, and a maximum of lifetime supervised
release).
240. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (explaining Congress's belief that sexual
offenders often suffer from psychological disorders that are not easily cured, and therefore
longer periods of supervised release are appropriate).
24 1. H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 49-50 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 684.
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this concern, Congress sought to impose long-term "monitoring and oversight"
for these offenders. 4
Congress, in adding subsection (k), demonstrated its belief that most child
sex offenders are not capable of a typical transition from incarceration to
freedom.243  One would be hard-pressed to argue that "long-term ...
monitoring and oversight" is irrational or inappropriate.244 It is the corollary to
this supervision that is problematic-revocation. The problem with revocation
is not necessarily that it is punitive-repeat sexual offenders deserve
punishment. It is that the supervised release system was not designed with the
goal of penalizing offenders. 4 Because the system has been stretched to fill
that role, many problems have arisen.
This Note presents three potential solutions to the problems facing the
supervised release system, each attempting to balance the competing concerns
of Congress and those defendants subject to supervised release. The
application of each potential solution to Dr. McElheney' s situation will
illustrate clearly their respective benefits and drawbacks. For these purposes, it
is important to remember that McElheney has been sentenced to ten years in
prison for the possession of child pornography. 24 6 In addition, he is subject to a
lifetime period of supervised release. 4 Should McElheney again be found in
possession of child pornography, he would face lifetime imprisornent as a
result of revocation.24
A. Solution 1
Solution I presents a minor adjustment to the supervised release scheme
as it applies to child sex offenders, while leaving the larger system unchanged.
As previously mentioned, Congress believes that sexual offenders are in need
242. Id.
243. See id. (finding that the five-year maximum was not consistent with the need for
increased periods of supervision for child sex offenders).
244. Id.
245. See United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that the primary objective of the supervised release system is to aid defendants in
their transition to mainstream society).
246. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (explaining that, for the purposes of
this Note, it will be assumed that McElheney was sentenced to ten years).
247. See United States v. McElheney, 524 F. Supp. 2d 983, 1007 (E.D. Tenn. 2007)
(imposing lifetime supervised release).
248. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (authorizing the revocation of the full period of
supervised release under § 3583(e)(3)).
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of long-term supervision .2 49 The supervised release system is well-equipped to
accomplish this goal. Governmental supervision certainly is an encroachment
on an offender's liberty2 5 -but this encroachment is far preferable to the total
deprivation of liberty that accompanies incarceration. For this reason, an
extended period of post-release supervision is an entirely appropriate
mechanism in which to address the rehabilitative concerns of Congress.
However, under the current system, with this extended period of supervision
comes the possibility of an extended period of incarceration in the event of
revocation.
In the standard supervised release setting, revocation may be based on any
violation of the conditions of release, whether or not the violation is criminal in
nature.25 In this setting, revocation is necessary. Without it, there would be no
available penalty for violations in which prosecution is not an option, as with
violations that are noncriminal. However, the only time revocation arises under
§ 3583(k) is when the violation is criminal. 5 Therefore, prosecution for the
violative act is always a possibility-and revocation is not the only "stick" that
may deter violations. In light of the foregoing, it seems that a less punitive
supervised release scheme under § 3583(k) may be appropriate, leaving the
more serious punishment to the adversarial trial system.
In light of the foregoing, defendants could still be subject to lifetime
periods of supervised release. However, because revocation is less necessary as
a punishment under § 3583, perhaps the five-year maximum period of
postrevocation incarceration should apply. Under this solution, supervision and
the conditions of release would still apply for the remainder of a defendant's
life. If the defendant violates release by committing another child sex offense,
he would be subject to a maximum sentence of five years based on revocation.
Because jeopardy does not attach at a revocation hearing, the Government
would then be free to prosecute the defendant in a full-trial setting, seeking the
harsher penalties that attach to the offense.
Applying Solution 1 to the Dr. McElheney scenario, one initially notes
that McElheney' s sentence will remain exactly the same. He will serve ten
years in prison for the child pornography offense, and will be subject to a
lifetime term of supervised release. Upon his release, McElheney will be
249. H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 49-50 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 684.
250. Cf Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 562 n.18 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring) ("The
alternative to detention, of course, is not unrestricted liberty, but supervised release.").
251. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) ("Although such violations
often lead to imprisonment, the violative conduct need not be criminal.").
252. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (2006) (authorizing revocation only as a result of the
commission of a crime included under the statute).
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subject to the terms of his release for the remainder of his life. This long-term
supervision is precisely what Congress sought in passing § 3583(k).
Where Solution 1 differs in relation to the status quo is upon revocation.
Under the current system, if Dr. McElheney were found in possession of child
pornography for a second time, he would face two consequences. First, a
second conviction carries a maximum penalty of twenty years.25 Second, as
previously explained, revocation of supervised release would result in lifetime
incarceration. As discussed at length above, most prosecutors, when presented
with this situation, would opt to first pursue revocation. However, under
Solution 1, this scenario changes substantially. Like before, if McElheney were
to be found in possession of child pornography, he would face two
consequences. A second conviction would still carry a twenty-year penalty.
However, revocation would result in a maximum of five years of incarceration.
McElheney would face twenty-five years in prison, and a new period of
supervised release after completion of his sentence. 
254
Solution 1 is the least drastic of the presented alternatives, and for that
reason, it may be the best. The legitimate concerns of supervision would be
addressed, and the defendant would still be subject to a lengthy sentence if
found guilty. The five-year maximum sentence resulting from revocation
would help to avoid a scenario in which prosecutors are pursuing revocation in
lieu of prosecution and would once again give true meaning to statutory
maximums like that in § 2252A(b)(2). Defendants would no longer be subject
to a lifetime of imprisonment based on a single judge finding a violation by a
preponderance of the evidence. In sum, Solution 1 allows for the supervised
release system to serve its intended purpose: Monitoring and oversight with the
end goal of successful rehabilitation. At the same time, punitive measures may
be pursued through the proper vehicle-the adversarial trial system.
Despite this commendable policy result, this solution is still flawed for one
substantial reason. Nothing about Solution 1 even attempts to address the
constitutional concerns presented throughout this entire Note. Defendants will
still be subject to revocation and incarceration without due process, even if for
a maximum sentence of "only" five years. While any attempt to argue with this
result will almost certainly be fruitless based on the Supreme Court's findings
253. Id § 2252A(b)(2).
254. Under the current hypothetical, a new period of supervised release would be
unnecessary. McElheney would still be subject to the terms of his lifetime supervised release
under his first conviction. However, this may not always be the case. Should McElheney have
received only twenty years of supervised release after his first conviction, this period would
have lapsed by the time he was released from his second conviction. A second prosecution
would enable the Government to attach a second period of supervised release, likely for life.
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in Johnson, 2 15 the idea that a person's liberty may be extinguished for five full
years based on a "more likely than not" standard is too disconcerting to accept.
The Apprendi issue will still be present, and courts will still attempt to
maneuver around it. Recall the supervised release hypothetical based on the
facts of Blakely. This hypothetical applied to the supervised release system as a
whole, and did not implicate the specific provisions of § 3583(k). Under
Solution 1, a defendant would still serve a total of ninety months in prison-
fifty-three months for the underlying offense, and thirty-seven months for
postrevocation incarceration. This ninety-month period would be in excess of
the fifty-three months authorized by the facts admitted in the plea agreement-
and would still implicate the Apprendi issue.
The courts would continue to avoid the Apprendi problem with the same
rationale; because the additional imprisonment is based on a statute separate
from that authorizing the base imprisonment, the two periods cannot be viewed
in the aggregate. 5 This reasoning again implicates the Double Jeopardy
257Clause and its protection against multiple punishments for the same offense.
Essentially, Solution 1, while softening the effects of these constitutional
problems, does nothing to address the problems themselves.
B. Solution 2
Solution 2 attempts to find an alternative answer, one that addresses both
Congress's concern that the "deep-seated aberrant sexual disorders" of child
sex offenders may not have disappeared by the time of the defendant's release
from prison, 5 as well as the underlying constitutional and policy concerns. If
the legislature is confident that these sexual offenders have not been
rehabilitated by the end of their prison sentences, why not simply increase the
statutory maximums for the offenses included under § 35 83(k)? By increasing
the initial sentences, the offender would be subject to around-the-clock
supervision, unable to re-offend. This seems to be the logical response to
sentences deemed too short to "cure" the offender-lengthen them.
255. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700-01 (observing that full due process protections are not
required at revocation hearings).
256. See, e.g., United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 489 (1 st Cir. 2005) (finding that
though supervised release is part of the sentence, it does not have to be aggregated with the
initial period of incarceration).
257. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (explaining that double
jeopardy protections prohibit "successive punishments and. ... successive prosecutions for the
same criminal offense").
258. H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 49-50 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 684.
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A substantial increase in the initial sentence gives the judiciary great
flexibility in regards to the supervised release system. Possibly the most
effective option would be to discard the whole regime. Federal supervised
release replaced the federal parole system in 1987.25 Solution 2 advocates a
return to a parole scheme in the federal criminal justice system. The main
difference from the current system would be structural. Whereas supervised
release "tacks on" a supervision period to be served once the full sentence has
been completed, the parole system "carves out" a period of supervision from the
260length of the original sentence.
Once again, Dr. McElheney' s situation will be used to demonstrate the
practical implementation of such a system. Under Solution 2, instead of a ten-
year sentence for possession of child pornography, McElheney would be
sentenced to a substantially longer sentence-perhaps twenty-five years. After
serving a substantial portion of this sentence, something in the neigh~borhood of
twenty years, McElheney would be eligible for parole. For the remainder of the
sentence, five years, he would be free from incarceration and subject to the
exact same supervision as under the current system.
Under this proposal, the oversight concerns are largely satisfied. In the
above example, McElheney would be subject to twenty-five total years of
supervision-the equivalent of a ten year sentence with fifteen years of
supervised release under the current system. Prior to § 3583(k), the defendant
would have been subject to only ten years imprisonment, and three years of
supervised release .26' In comparison, twenty-five years of supervision is clearly
a large step towards achieving the goal of "long-term monitoring and
oversight.0 62
There is no danger of incentivizing the circumvention of repeat offender
statutes under this alternative. Of course, should McElheney again be found in
possession of child pornography, he would be in violation of his parole, and
would serve the remaining five years in prison. The Government would almost
certainly prosecute McElheney for his second offense, seeking the maximum of
259. See Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 400 (1991) (explaining that the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 replaced the federal parole system with supervised release, but
the changes did not become effective until 1987).
260. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2008)
("Unlike parole, a term of supervised release does not replace a portion of the sentence of
imprisonment, but rather is an order of supervision in addition to any term of imprisonment
imposed by the court.").
261. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(4) (2006) (classifying those offenses with a maximum often
years as Class D felonies); id § 3583(b)(2) (limiting supervised release for Class D felonies to a
term of not more than three years).
262. H.R. RaE. No. 108-66, at 49-50 (2003).
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twenty years.26  As in Solution 1, the defendant's punishment is the result of a
full trial, as opposed to a revocation hearing.
Perhaps the most laudable characteristic of Solution 2 is the fact that no
Apprendi problems are present. In the above example, the statutory maximum
for the first offense was twenty-five years. The defendant served only those
twenty-five years. By carving the period of supervision out of the statutory
maximum sentence, instead of adding it onto the end of the statutory maximum
sentence, the system would avoid Apprendi entirely-the sentence is not in
excess of the statutory maximum. The period of supervision, as it is under the
current system, would be part of the initial penalty. However, the courts would
not need to avoid Apprendi by dividing the penalty between two statutes.
There would simply be one punishment of twenty-five years for the initial
offense, and therefore no double jeopardy issues would arise, because there
would not be multiple punishments for the offense.
Of course, this would to some extent also deprive the criminal justice
system of the primary benefit of supervised release-an effective mechanism to
aid offenders in their transition from prison to liberty.2 In effect, Solution 2
transfers a large portion of a defendant's sentence from supervised release (with
a threat of possible revocation) to incarceration. Under the current system,
McElheney would serve ten years in prison, with lifetime supervised release.
This proposal would double the length of the prison term to twenty years, while
greatly reducing the period of post-release supervision. While both
incarceration and supervision allow for the monitoring of an offender, only
supervised release has the primary objective of rehabilitation. Limiting the
length of the supervised release period can hardly be said to "improve the odds
of a successful transition from the prison to liberty. 2 6 1 Solution 2, while
avoiding the constitutional problems of the current system and Solution 1,
sacrifices the commendable underlying rationale for supervised release. It
would seem, at least to this author, that a constitutional but ineffective scheme
is little better than an unconstitutional scheme.
263. If this proposal were to be implemented, it is likely that the maximum penalty would
be far greater than twenty years for a second offense. Because, in this hypothetical, the first
offense carried a sentence of twenty-five years, it is likely that a second offense would carry
about fifty years.
264. See United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating
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C Solution 3
Solution 3 attempts to find a way to eliminate the constitutional defects in
the current system, while still addressing the oversight concerns of Congress
and furthering the rehabilitative aims of the supervised release system.
Whereas Solution I attempted to mitigate the effects of the underlying
problems with the current system, and Solution 2 simply attempted to avoid the
problems (and the system) altogether, Solution 3 attempts to actually solve both
the constitutional and policy issues facing the supervised release regime. As
mentioned several times throughout this Note, the most troubling aspect of the
entire system is the exposure of these defendants to drastically increased prison
sentences based on a "guilty" verdict at a revocation hearing with minimal due
process protections.266  Solution 1 attempted to decrease the lengths of
incarceration stemming from revocation. Solution 3 will address this problem
from a different angle-advocating for increased due process protections at
revocation hearings, while leaving the resulting prison sentences largely
untouched.
Under this approach, defendants would be entitled to the same due process
protections-specifically the reasonable doubt standard and right to a jury
trial-at revocation hearings as they are at full-blown prosecutions. As an
initial matter, the Government would be less motivated to pursue revocation
instead of prosecution because the required effort would be substantially similar
in either arena. No longer would revocation hearings be a quick and easy
process for the prosecutor. This motivation could be further reduced by
tweaking § 3583(k) to provide that a revocation may not result in a period of
incarceration longer than the maximum penalty available for the violation
through prosecution. This would prevent repeat offender statutes with
relatively low statutory maximums from being rendered moot. If the same
effort must be expended in a revocation hearing as in a trial, and if the penalties
are similar, the danger that trials will be replaced by revocation hearings is
avoided.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court reasoned that if revocation were to be
considered punishment for the violative act, due process would be required.26
The lack of due process seemed to be the driving force behind the Court's
266. See supra Part HI (lamenting the limited due process protections offered to a defendant
at a revocation hearing, especially in light of the potentially serious consequences).
267. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) (finding that because of the
lack of due process protections afforded to defendants at supervised release hearings,
considering revocation to be punishment for the violation of the conditions of release would be
constitutionally problematic).
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classification of revocation as punishment for the initial offense.16 1 Thus, if full
due process protections are provided, there is no reason why revocation could
not be considered punishment for the violative act, instead of punishment for
the original offense .269 This rationale would, in turn, block any application of
Apprendi. If revocation is not part of the punishment for the original offense,
the resulting incarceration would not be aggregated with the initial period of
incarceration-alleviating any Apprendi concerns. Likewise, the same-
elements test has no applicability if there is only one punishment for the
original offense. 7
Under Solution 3, Dr. McElheney would still serve ten years in prison and
be subject to lifetime supervised release. If he were to be found in possession
of child pornography for a second time, he would face revocation, just as under
the current system. Because the maximum sentence for a second offense under
§ 2252A(b)(2) is only twenty years, 7 McElheney would face a maximum of
twenty years upon revocation. If he were to commit an offense included under
§ 3583(k) that carries, for example, a life sentence, he would face a maximum
sentence of life upon revocation. Essentially, the prosecutor would no longer
be induced into pursuing revocation instead of prosecution, as both methods
would be on equal footing. 7
For the reasons stated above, McElheney would have no Apprendi
argument. The revocation and resulting imprisonment would be deemed
2 68. Id
269. In Johnson, the Court also suggests that characterizing revocation and the resulting
imprisonment as punishment for the violative act could be constitutionally problematic in
situations where a noncriminal act led to the revocation. Id. at 700. While this situation would
never arise under § 35 83(k), it would under normal supervised release circumstances. Though it
may seem constitutionally questionable to incarcerate a defendant for a noncriminal act (in
violation of the conditions of release) at first glance, the federal system already allows similar
actions. Under § 2262, if an interstate nexus can be established, a person "with the intent to
engage in conduct that violates the portion of a protection order that prohibits . . . contact or
communication with, or physical proximity to, another person" is subject to a maximum of five
years, even if no other criminal act is committed. 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1), (b)(5) (2006).
Simply the violation of the protective order is sufficient justification for the incarceration. Id
Similar reasoning would permit the incarceration of a defendant that violates the conditions of
his supervised release, even if the violative act were noncriminal.
270. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (explaining that the double
jeopardy protection only applies to multiple punishments or prosecutions for the same offense).
If revocation is considered punishment for the act that precipitates the revocation, that leaves
only the primary prison sentence as punishment for the initial offense.
271. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2) (2006).
272. This is not to say that there will no longer be advantages to pursuing revocation over
prosecution. If nothing else, it provides the prosecution with a choice of forums in which to
bring the action.
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punishment for the second possession offense. While no double jeopardy
problem would result from the same-elements test, one may arise in another
context. Under Solution 3, the Goverrnent would have to choose either
revocation or prosecution, not both. Because this proposal requires that
revocation be viewed as punishment for the violative act, a subsequent
prosecution for that same act almost certainly would violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause. 7 However, because the Government could choose either
revocation or prosecution, they likely would choose the route that leads to the
most appropriate punishment. 7
The primary goal of Solution 3 is to return supervised release to its proper
role in the criminal justice system. By changing the revocation process to one
that mimics the trial process, the supervised release system loses much of its
punitive force, as it will be superfluous in many, if not most, situations. But is
that a bad thing? Under this proposal, "punishment" will most often come via
prosecution. Thus, the main function of supervised release will be to provide
the "long-term. ... monitoring and oversight" sought by Congress. 7 Dr.
McElheney would still be subject to life-long supervision, because the changes
of Solution 3 only apply to the revocation process. And, in the event that
revocation becomes warranted, McElheney would still be subject to a
substantial period of incarceration. The changes merely serve to provide
adequate protection for the liberty interests of the accused.
D. The Recommended Solution
Solution 3, while potentially the most expensive in terms of time and
resources, is the most desirable proposal. It not only addresses the legitimate
concerns of Congress in supervising sexual offenders, but avoids any
constitutional infirmities and provides for the punishment of repeat offenders
through the proper mechanism. "Due process" was deemed so inmportant by the
273. See Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000) ("Where the acts of violation
are criminal in their own right, they may be the basis for separate prosecution, which would
raise an issue of double jeopardy if the revocation of supervised release were also punishment
for the same offense.").
274. For example, if the defendant's original sentence included a supervised release term of
only ten years, revocation would lead to a maximum of ten years incarceration. But if the
violative act carries a thirty-year maximum sentence, it is likely that the Government would
choose prosecution. Under this proposal, prosecution will always provide equal or greater
punishment, and therefore will often be chosen instead of revocation.
275. H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 49-50 (2003), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 684.
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Founding Fathers that it was included in the Bill Of Rights.276 Why then, has
the criminal justice system gone to such great lengths to deny it to those
defendants subject to revocation? "No person shall be ... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." 277 Unfortunately, the cur-rent
supervised release system does not comply with this fundamental maxim, and
the courts have gone to great lengths to justify this noncompliance. Those
members of society who commit the horrible crimes included under § 3583(k)
certainly deserve harsh punishment-but that punishment should be delivered
through the proven adversarial system, not the supervised release process.
VIII. Conclusion
This Note addresses three separate overarching themes. First, it
demonstrates the unconstitutionality of the federal supervised release scheme,
particularly as it applies to § 3583(k) sexual offenders, by using federal case
law. Second, the Note focuses on the troublesome policy problems presented
by the current system. Third, it provides several potential solutions to reconcile
the legitimate rehabilitative and punitive concerns of the legislature with the
liberties of the accused.
The Supreme Court has determined that any imprisonment resulting from
the revocation of a period of supervised release is to be considered "part of the
penalty for the initial offense. 2 78 Elsewhere, the Court held that "any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a
reasonable doubt."2 79 For revocation to occur, the Government must show that
the defendant violated the terms of supervised release 28 0-in other words, the
Government must prove a fact. If this fact leads to incarceration in excess of
the statutory maximum penalty for the initial offense, the defendant should be
entitled to a jury trial and reasonable doubt standard.
Unfortunately, the courts of appeals have not followed this reasoning, and
instead have rejected the notion that an Apprendi problem may be present.28
276. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring that a defendant receive due process before
being deprived of "life, liberty, or property").
277. Id
278. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700.
279. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999) (emphasis added).
280. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006) (allowing revocation "if the cort... finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of supervised release").
281. See, e.g., United States v. Huerta-Pimental, 445 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2006)
("Apprendi has no effect on the imposition of § 3583 supervised release."); United States v.
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The principal rationale for this finding seems to be the fact that the courts have
broken the "penalty for the initial offense" into two components. 8 The first
part of that penalty is the initial prison sentence, which must fall below the
applicable statutory maximum. The second part of that penalty is the
imprisonment resulting from revocation. Each of these components is
authorized by a separate statute. The courts have determined that as long as
each component penalty falls within the acceptable range for its individual
authorizing statute, there is no Apprendi problem, regardless of the total amount
of prison time served by the defendant.
This reasoning leads the courts into a potential double jeopardy issue. A
defendant may not be punished twice for a single offense. 8 The courts, in
avoiding Apprendi, have ruled that the punishment for the initial crime is based
on two separate statutes. 284  When a prosecutor obtains a conviction of a
defendant, she need not prove any additional element to secure punishment
through the supervised release statute. Effectively, the offender is subject to
two separate prison terms, based on two separate statutes, as punishment for a
single offense.
Even if the courts have found a way to maneuver around the Constitution
successfully, the question still remains-is doing so beneficial? Section
35 83(k), when read in tandem with the aforementioned policy statement, results
in lifetime periods of supervised release for a substantial number of defendants
sentenced under the statute .2 85 A "one-size-fits-all" approach to sentencing
does not take into account the varying degrees of reprehensibility of the swath
of crimes included under § 3583(k). 8 And while the supervision itself is
unobjectionable, the revocation and resulting life sentences are quite
troublesome. Through the revocation process, repeat offenders are exposed to
McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Under current law, imprisonment for violation of
supervised release may exceed the time that the defendant could have been jailed on his original
conviction.").
282. See, e.g., United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 490 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[W]hen
determining whether a sentence exceeds the maximum permissible under the Constitution, each
aspect of the sentence must be analyzed separately.").
283. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 696 (1993).
284. See McNeil, 415 F.3d at 277 ("[Tlhe imposition of supervised release and the
sanctions for violation are authorized by a statute. ... that is separate from the regime that
governs incarceration for the original offense.").
285. See supra notes 25-28, 30-33 and accompanying text (describing the effect of the
policy statement, which recommends that all sex offenders be sentenced to the maximum
allowable punishment, on the imposition of supervised release terms).
286. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (comparing two crimes with disparate
penalties, both of which are included under § 3583(k)).
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life sentences even though Congress has explicitly determined that their second
offense deserves a lesser punishment. 8 While the supervised release system
may have a legitimate role in the criminal justice system, the circumvention of
legislative intent and the trial process is not it.
The solutions presented in this Note attempt to resolve these policy
problems in a constitutional manner, while still giving effect to the legitimate
aims of the supervised release system. Sexual offenders require supervision
and deserve punishment. This Note aims only to force punishment back into its
proper realm-the realm of the adversarial trial system, replete with due
process protections. The Constitution demands nothing less.
287. See supra Part VI.A (demonstrating the conflict by comparing the maximum
punishments available through revocation and through § 2252A(b)(2)).
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